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Abstract
In 2007, Korea implemented the world’s only mandatory real name verification system for
individuals wishing to post content on popular Korean internet portals. This system, which
expanded in 2009 to include additional portals, has so far been relatively ineffective at its stated
purpose of reducing instances of online libel. Together with Korea’s censorship of certain internet
sites, the real name verification system distinguishes Korea as regulating internet use more
heavily than other democratic societies. 
I argue that the real name verification system is unlikely to successfully deter future acts of
cyber libel, but will rather hinder socially useful online activities, such as free expression on
matters of social and political significance. Possible means for strengthening enforcement of the
real name verification system would provide little promise of preventing defamation while further
interfering with freedom of expression and personal privacy. 
I propose that Korean law can more effectively balance protection of private reputations with
individual liberty interests by changing the real name verification system from a mandatory
requirement to an internet portal opt-in system. Korea might also consider an emphasis on civil
remedies as a means for minimizing the occurrence and consequences of cyber libel while
simultaneously preserving a free and collaborative internet. 
I. Introduction
The widespread proliferation of internet access throughout many societies
worldwide has facilitated not only socially positive practices, but also
detrimental ones. The internet is a vehicle for access to vast stores of
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information, but also facilitates the circulation of misinformation.1) While the
internet provides unprecedented opportunities for physically disparate
individuals to interact, collaborate, and express themselves,2) it has also
introduced opportunities for abusive self-expression, notably through online
defamation (“Cyber Libel”).3) As the national population with the highest rate
of high-speed internet access in the world,4) the Republic of Korea (“Korea”)
has experienced both the blessings and curses of online social networking in
an unusually large measure. In Korea, the debate over how to balance free
online expression and the prevention and punishment of cyber-crime is
intense and has thus far resulted in a legal regime for internet regulation that
is more restrictive than that of many other democratic nations.5)
Amongst Korea’s most recent internet regulation measures, and arguably
its most unique and controversial, is a mandatory procedure for real name
verification (the “Real Name Verification System” or the “System”). The
System, created by an amendment to the Act on Promotion of Information
and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection
[Jeongbo tongsinmang iyong chokjin mit jeongbo boho deunge kwanhan
beopryul] (the “Information and Communications Act”),6) requires heavily
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1) Significant in the case of Korean society were online rumors linking imported American
beef with mad cow disease. See Jin-seo Cho, Portals Turning Into Rumor Mills?, KOREA TIMES, May
14, 2008, available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2008/05/123_24189. html. 
2) See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression
for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (2004) (arguing that “[t]he digital revolution
changes the factual assumptions underlying the social organization and social practices of
freedom of speech …”). 
3) This phrase is apt because defamatory material presented online takes fixed form, such as
text or recorded media.
4) See OpenNet Initiative: South Korea, http://opennet.net/research/profiles/south-korea
(May 10, 2007). In recent years, Korea has consistently led the world in societal broadband
internet access. See S. Korea Tops OECD in Internet Penetration, KOREA TIMES, June 17, 2008,
available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2008/06/123_26007.html; Rob
Frieden, Lessons from Broadband Development in Canada, Japan, Korea and the United States, 29
TELECOMM. POL’Y 595, 597 (2005). 
5) For instance, Korea engages in some internet censorship. See OpenNet Initiative: South
Korea, supra note 4. This issue is more fully discussed infra Section IV, “Comparison with Other
Nations.”
6) This law has the purpose of combating legal violations occurring on the internet and
addresses collection and management of personal information of internet users.
trafficked internet portals7) to direct users to verify their identities on a public
institution website using their national identification numbers before the users
are allowed to post content on the site.8) This information is then retained for
potential use in criminal investigations.9) With two years of experience with
the Real Name Verification System, reasonable concerns and criticism exist
over the law’s effectiveness at serving a legitimate social function within a
democratic society.
This article examines the Real Name Verification System and argues that it
has been and will continue to be not only ineffective at its stated purpose of
preventing and punishing Cyber Libel, but also an unwarranted incursion on
the liberties of Korean individuals. The System threatens to chill legitimate
political and social activities in the online space, thus frustrating legitimate
and socially generative10) uses of the internet without achieving meaningful
progress to prevent Cyber Libel.11)
This article will first describe defamation law in Korea, especially as it
relates to Cyber Libel,12) and the law regarding the Real Name Verification
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7) Under the law as it is presently enforced, internet portals with more than 100,000 users
per day must comply with the Real Name Verification System. JEONGBO TONGSINMANG IYONG
CHOKJIN MIT JEONGBO BOHO DEUNGE KWANHAN BEOPRYUL [ACT ON PROMOTION OF INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK UTILIZATION AND INFORMATION PROTECTION] Act No. 9637, Apr. 22, 2009,
art. 44-5(1)2 [hereinafter INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK ACT]; JEONGBO TONGSINMANG
IYONG CHOKJIN MIT JEONGBO BOHO DEUNGE KWANHAN BEOPRYUL SIHAENGRYEONG [Enforcement Decree on
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK ACT] Presidential Decree No. 21719, Sept. 9, 2009,
art. 30.
8) Enforcement Decree on INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK ACT, art. 29. 
9) Id.
10) The term “generativity” was applied by Professor Jonathan Zittrain to describe the
power of the internet to facilitate creativity and collaboration through the unique degrees of
interconnectivity that are possible on an open worldwide network. See Jonathan Zittrain, The
Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1981-96 (2006). Zittrain himself defines generativity as
“a system’s capacity to produce unanticipated change through unfiltered contributions from
broad and varied audiences.” JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET — AND HOW TO
STOP IT 70 (2008).
11) See Jisuk Woo et al., Internet kesipan silmyeongjaeui hyokwae daehan siljeung yeongu:
Jaehanjeokboninhwakinjae sihaenge ttareun kesipan nae keulsseuki haengwi mit bibangkwa yokseolui
byeonhwareul jungsimeuro [An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Real-name System on Internet
Bulletin Boards: Focusing on How the Real-name System and Users’ Characteristics Influence the Use of
Slanderous Comments and Swear Words] 48 KOREAN J. OF PUB. ADMIN. (forthcoming 2010) (Korean).
12) Cyber Libel is specifically addressed in the INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
ACT, art. 70.
System. The social background and context that helped propel a recent
expansion of the Real Name Verification System will then be provided. In
particular, the protests against Korea’s importation of United States beef
during the summer of 2008 and the suicide of popular Korean actress Jin-sil
Choi merit description. I will briefly compare the Real Name Verification
System with the internet regulation policies of other nations before analyzing
the initial results and controversies that have stemmed from the implementation
of the law and recent criminal prosecutions of internet activities. Two
particular issues of note are the decision by Google Inc. (“Google”) to prevent
users of YouTube13) in Korea from being prompted to register their personal
identity information and the prosecution of “Minerva,” a Korean economics
blogger. 
I will then pose several specific problems with the Real Name Verification
System from a legal and social perspective.14) In particular, the Real Name
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13) YouTube is a streaming media website (www.youtube.com), owned by Google, that
permits registered users to upload videos, which can then be searched and streamed by all those
who access the site. Registered users can also post comments pertaining to particular uploaded
videos. 
14) I do not address possible constitutional law objections that might be made to the Real
Name Verification System. The Korean Constitutional Court has grappled in the past with the
issue of balancing internet freedom with efforts to regulate online activities. The Constitutional
Court has stated, “If communication in the internet, which has now established itself as the
largest and most important medium of expression, is regulated by order-centric notions, it will
create a big impediment to the evolution of freedom of expression.” 14(1) PANRYEJIP 616, 632 (99
Heonma 480) (Constitutional Court, June 27, 2002). For further discussion of this issue, see Kyu
Ho Youm, Defamation Law and the Internet in South Korea, 9 MEDIA & ARTS L. REV. 141, 149-151
(2004) (citing Hae-won Lee, Bulontongsin Kyujewa Pyohyeonui Jayu — Heonjae99Heonma480
Jeonkitongsinsaeopbeop Je53jo deung Wiheonhwakinkyeoljeong Sogo [The Government Regulations on
“Improper Communication” and the Right to Free Speech], 1 EONRONKWA BEOP [J. OF MEDIA L., ETHICS,
AND POL’Y] 33, 52-65 (2002) (Korean)). 
It has already been argued that, in fact, the Real Name Verification System has serious
constitutional problems under Korean law, including interfering with anonymous free speech,
free political speech, and the protection of personal data. Sung Gi Hwang, Internet Silmyeongjee
kwanhan Heonbeophakjeok Yeongu [A Constitutional Study on the Mandatory Personal Identification on
the Internet], 25 BEOPHAK NONCHONG [HANYANG L. REV.] 7, 36 (2008) (Korean). See also Yong-suk
Hwang, Internet Kesipan Silmyeongjee daehan Bipanjeok Yeongu [Critical Approach to the
Implementation of Real-Name system on Bulletin Board of the Internet], 15 EONRONKWA SAHWE [PRESS
AND SOC’Y] 97, 129 (2007) (Korean). While these issues are important to my analysis, I do not
analyze constitutionality as it might be assessed by the Korean Constitutional Court, but
evaluate the Real Name Verification System on the basis of its efficacy and consequences.
Verification System has thus far proven ineffective at deterring Cyber Libel,15)
and the only mechanisms for improving effectiveness are too extreme to merit
serious consideration. Furthermore, the Real Name Verification System
interferes with the significant benefits of personal liberty and social and
political dialogue achieved through widespread internet use. The law is
overbroad and purports to defend “privacy”16) by interfering with privacy in a
different but also legitimate sense: the privacy of accessing and engaging in
the exchange of information online, potentially of a legal but controversial
nature, without fear of repercussion.17) I then propose the possibility of
changing the Real Name Verification System from a requirement to an
internet portal opt-in program. I conclude with a short reflection on the
benefits of emphasizing existing civil law for the redress of Cyber Libel and
the avoidance of excessive government entanglement with online
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15) Several studies have cast doubt on the effectiveness of the Real Name Verification
System at preventing Cyber Libel. See Woo et al., supra note 11, at 20-21; Yong-suk Hwang, supra
note 14, at 110-11.
16) It may be useful to briefly distinguish a number of meanings that may be attached to the
term “privacy,” each relating to the ability of the individual to control the revelation of
information relating to her person. Used as the rationale for the Real Name Verification System,
“privacy” refers to the interest in one’s reputation and privacy of personal affairs that may
reflect upon reputation. “Information privacy” is a subject that Korean courts have addressed in
the realm of tort suits alleging psychological damages relating to the leaking of personal
information. See Seong-Wook Heo, Bulbeophaengwibeoplie Uihan Internetsangui Jeongbo Privacy
Bohomunjee kwanhan Ilgo — Lineage II Game ID · Bimilbeonho Nochulsageoneul jungsimeuro —
[Critical Thought on the Protection of Information Privacy on the Internet through the Legal Principles of
Tort: In Relation to the Case Concerning the Disclosure of IDs and Passwords of Online Game Lineage II
(Seoul Central District Court 2005Gadan240057)], 30 MINSAPANRYEYEONGU [J. OF PRIVATE CASE LAW
STUD.] 753, 756-61 (2008) (Korean). We should also distinguish “identity privacy,” one’s interest
in controlling the expression and sharing of one’s identity. See Jisuk Woo and Jae-Hyup Lee, The
Limitations of “Information Privacy” in the Network Environment, 7 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 2, 23-
31 (2006) (arguing for “identity privacy” as a means of promoting social equality and more fully
realized social and political freedoms).
17) The point has been made that while the detriments of anonymity in the online
environment are much discussed (and prominently include Cyber Libel and copyright piracy),
the benefits of anonymity, such as facilitating free speech and the avoidance of personal
information profiling, are often ignored. See Jisuk Woo, The Right Not to be Identified: Privacy and
Anonymity in the Interactive Media Environment, 8 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 949, 962-64 (2006) (citing A.
Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living With Anonymity, Digital Cash and
Distributed Databases, 15 J. OF L. AND COM. 395 (1996)). See also Woo and Lee, supra note 16, at 23-
31. 
communications. 
II. Relevant Defamation Law
1. Korean Constitution
The most fundamental basis for Korean defamation law is arguably found
not in statute, but in the Constitution of Korea (the “Constitution”). Under the
Constitution, “Neither speech nor the press shall violate the honor or rights of
other persons nor undermine public morals or social ethics.”18) Protection of
personal reputation is thus promoted by the language of the Constitution as
well as expressly protected by statute (redressable by criminal penalty19)
and/or civil recovery20)). The Constitution further provides that constitutional
rights may be abridged as necessary “for national security, the maintenance of
law and order, or for public welfare.”21)
While limitation on expression that violates the rights of others is hardly
unique,22) its inclusion in the language of a national constitution speaks to the
sensitivity of issues such as defamation in Korean society.23) Faced with
difficult decisions and compromises between competing values, Korea has a
substantial body of jurisprudence seeking to balance freedom of expression
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18) DAEHANMINGUK HEONBEOP [CONSTITUTION OF KOREA], art. 21(4) (1987), translated at
http://english.ccourt.go.kr/home/english/welcome/republic.jsp (last visited Nov. 13, 2009). 
19) HYEONGBEOP [CRIMINAL CODE], arts. 307 and 309.
20) MINBEOP [CIVIL CODE], art. 751.
21) CONSTITUTION OF KOREA, art. 37(2). National security-related cases have been distinguished
as being an area of freedom of expression-related jurisprudence where the Constitutional Court
hesitates to interfere with legislative pronouncements. See Kyu Ho Youm, The Constitutional
Court and Freedom of Expression, 1 J. KOREAN L. 37, 70 (2001).
22) For instance, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, Europ. T.S. No. 005, art. 10(2), states, “The exercise of
[the freedom of expression], since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to
such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary
in a democratic society … for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others … ”
23) The language has been contrasted with the United States Constitution’s First
Amendment language, which protects freedom of speech without explicit qualification. See, e.g.,
Youngjoon Kwon, Tortious Liability of Internet Service Providers for Defamation: A Korean
Perspective, 5 J. KOREAN L. 121, 127 (2006). 
against effective enforcement of laws.24)
2. Korean Criminal Code
The Korean Criminal Code addresses defamation in Article 30725):
1) A person who defames another by publicly alleging facts shall be
punished by imprisonment with or without prison labor for not more
than 2 years or by a fine not exceeding 5 million won;
2) A person who defames another by publicly alleging false26) facts
shall be punished by imprisonment with prison labor for not more
than 5 years, suspension of professional qualification for not more than
10 years, or a fine not exceeding 10 million won. 
Cyber Libel is specifically addressed under the Information and Com-
munications Act27):
1) Any person who has defamed any other person by publicly
alleging facts through information and communications networks with
the purpose of defaming him shall be punished by imprisonment with
or without prison labor for not more than 3 years or by a fine not
exceeding 20 million won;
2) Any person who has defamed any other person by publicly
alleging false facts through information and communications networks
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24) Though the Constitution defines freedom of expression as limited, this right is a
particularly sensitive issue in Korea because of its recent history with an authoritarian
government. “Demands for freedom of expression … were displayed more than anything else
when Korea moved from an authoritarian rule to democracy. The Constitutional Court took an
active attitude while drawing the boundaries for the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
expression.” Jong-Sup Chong, Hangukui Minjuhwae Isseoseo Heonbeopjaepansowa Kibonkwonui
Silhyeon [The Constitutional Court and the Attainment of Fundamental Rights in the Democratization of
Korea: 1988-1998], 40 SEOUL DAEHAKGYO BEOPHAK [SEOUL L. J.] 226, 241 (1999) (Korean).
25) CRIMINAL CODE, art. 307.
26) Under Korean law, the crime of defamation can be committed even where the
underlying facts are true; falsity of the defamatory statement is not an essential element of the
offense, but rather increases the maximum penalties.
27) INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK ACT, art. 70. 
with the purpose of defaming him shall be punished by imprisonment
with prison labor for not more than 7 years, the suspension of
professional qualification for not more than 10 years, or by a fine not
exceeding 50 million won … 
Cyber Libel is therefore punished with stronger penalties than libel
expressed through other channels,28) providing that the evidence establishes
the perpetrator’s intent to defame the victim.29)
3. The Real Name Verification Requirement
In 2007, Korea became the first (and so far only) nation in the world to
implement a national name verification requirement for online postings.30)
The measure was introduced as an amendment of the Information and
Communications Act and passed on January 26, 2007.31) The language of the
statute provides that internet portals with more than 100,000 users per day
must direct their users to a public institution-managed registration site where
they confirm their identities using Korean national identification numbers;32)
the identifying data is preserved and can be matched in the future with
particular posts.33) However, the details of implementation were left to
enforcement decrees.34) Under the original enforcement decree, internet
portals with more than 300,000 users per day and news sites with more than
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28) Libel in general is distinguished from slander in article 309 of the CRIMINAL CODE, which
provides for the same elements of the offense but includes higher maximum penalties for libel. 
29) Note that articles 307 and 309 of the CRIMINAL CODE do not include intent to defame as an
element of the defamation offense.
30) The only other locality with a comprehensive real name verification system is the city of
Hangzhou, China. See Qiu Li Hua and Yue De Liang, “Wang Luo shi ming zhi” wei he nan? —
Hang zhou shi shi “wang luo an bao tiao li” diao cha [Internet real-name registration system: Why so
difficult to implement? An Investigation into the implementation of the Hangzhou Regulations for
Network Security Protection], XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, May 19, 2009, available at http://news.
xinhuanet.com/ newscenter/2009-05/19/content_11399392.htm (Chinese). 
31) INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK ACT, art. 44-5.
32) Id. See also Hyung-eun Kim, Do new Internet regulations curb free speech?, JOONGANG DAILY,
Aug. 13, 2008, available at http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2893577.
33) Enforcement Decree on INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK ACT, art. 29.
34) INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK ACT, art. 44-5(1), (2).
200,000 viewers per day were required to comply with the Real Name
Verification System.35) In early 2009, the enforcement decree was changed to
expand the Real Name Verification System to include all internet portals with
more than 100,000 users per day.36) The Information and Communications Act
provides that internet portals are to respond to complaints of allegedly
defamatory content37) by following certain takedown procedures.38) Korean
internet portals generally describe their responsive steps in online terms of
use.39)
III. Social Catalysts for Strengthening the Real Name
Verification System
Understanding the impetus for the expansion of the Real Name Verification
System40) requires a brief explanation of several events which occurred in
2008. Cultural context is critical in understanding the appeal of this law, but
the key cultural characteristics in question are issues of current events and the
present condition of Korean society.41)
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35) Enforcement Decree on INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK ACT, Presidential
Decree No. 20668, Feb. 29, 2008, art. 30.
Initially, the Real Name Verification System requirement applied to 37 internet portals and
news sites. Tong-hyung Kim, More Limits Planned on Internet Anonymity, KOREA TIMES, Oct. 3,
2008, available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2008/10/123_32121.html.
36) Enforcement Decree of the INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK ACT, Presidential
Decree No. 21278, Jan. 28, 2009, art. 30.
37) The scope of defamatory materials to be taken down is established in the INFORMATION
AND COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK ACT, art. 44-7(1), (2).
38) The INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK ACT prescribes that internet portals
delete obviously offensive posts, while taking down posts of ambiguous legality for 30 days
during a review period. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK ACT, art. 44-2(4).
39) See, e.g., Naver Connect Center, http://help.naver.com/claim_main.asp (last visited
Nov. 13, 2009) (Korean).
40) As discussed supra note 36, the law presently applies to all internet portals with more
than 100,000 viewers per day.
41) Korean cultural attitudes, such as high regard for the importance of personal reputations
and the protection of intellectual property interests, are often said to be shaped by Korea’s
Confucian tradition. See, e.g., Sun-Je Sung, Law of Defamation in Korea, 30 KOREAN J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 1, 6-7 (2002); YOUNG KIM, BACKGROUND READING MATERIAL ON THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 161 (1996); Sang-Hyun Song and Seong-Ki Kim, The Impact of 
1. Beef Protests
Modern Korean society has included recurring instances of widespread
public protests, which have often utilized the internet for disseminating
information and organizing. For instance, in 2002, OhmyNews42) reported on
an accident in which two Korean girls were killed by an American army
tractor.43) Alerted to the incident, Koreans organized protests online and
within one week, the largest anti-U.S. demonstrations in Korean history were
staged in Seoul.44)
A more recent illustration of Korean internet organization and populist
efforts were the U.S. beef protests held against President Myung-bak Lee’s
administration. President Lee agreed to lift Korea’s five-year ban on
importation of American beef in 2008.45) Online coalescence of people opposed
to the decision facilitated forty days of growing protests in the streets of
Seoul.46) Fueled by health concerns, as well as broader issues of sovereignty
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Multilateral Trade Negotiations on Intellectual Property Laws in Korea, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 118,
120 (1994); ARTHUR WINEBURG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN ASIA §1.03, at 1-9 to 1-15
(Arthur Wineburg ed., 2d ed. 1999); Yong-sik Song, Hyunjaejojak kwan beopuie munjaejum
[Problems with the Current Copyright Law (I)], 19 PYŎNHOSA: SEOULJIBANG PYONHOSAHWE [LAWYER:
BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE SEOUL DISTRICT] 181, 182 (1989); SANG-HAN HAN, CHOJAKKWON UI POPJE WA
SILMU [COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE] 25 (1988); Arthur Wineburg, Jurisprudence in Asia: Enforcing
Intellectual Property Rights, 5 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 25, 26 (1997). I do not argue the validity of
such asserted influences here, but note that current cultural environment and events provide an
elegantly direct explanation for the Real Name Verification System without reference to Korea’s
historical connection with Confucianism. For a more detailed treatment of the “Confucian
Argument” as an explanation for common Korean attitudes regarding file-sharing, see John
Leitner, A Legal and Cultural Comparison of File-Sharing Disputes in Japan and the Republic of Korea
and Implications for Future Cyber-Regulation, 22 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 38-42 (2008).
42) OhmyNews is an internet-based news source that utilizes information gathered by users
to provide a popular alternative news source in Korea. See DAN GILLMOR, WE THE MEDIA 110-135
(2006).
43) Jonathan Watts, World’s First Internet President Logs On, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 24, 2003,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2003/feb/24/newmedia.koreanews.
44) Id.
45) See Sang-hun Choe, South Koreans Press Anti-Government Protests, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/20/world/asia/20korea.html.
46) Sang-hun Choe, S. Korean Cabinet Offers to Quit After Beef Protests, N.Y. TIMES, June 10,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/10/world/asia/10korea.html.
and self-determination,47) the protests continued even after all the members of
President Lee’s cabinet offered to resign.48)
Much concern over the social unrest exemplified by the beef protests
focused on the view that online organization and the dissemination of
misinformation were responsible for the magnitude of the protests,
particularly the rumor that American beef could infect consumers with mad
cow disease.49) This, in turn, provided a powerful initial catalyst to further
amend the law and broaden the scope of the Real Name Verification
System.50) In defending the need for further measures, President Lee said that
Korea must counteract “a phenomenon in which inaccurate, false information
is disseminated; prompting social unrest that spreads like an epidemic.”51)
Before the Real Name Verification System was expanded, a major Korean
current event impacted public opinion in favor of the measure.
2. Jin-sil Choi Suicide
Jin-sil Choi was a prolific Korean television and film actress whose
popularity earned her the nickname “the Nation’s Actress.”52) After Ms. Choi
committed suicide in October of 2008, speculation grew that her suicidal
feelings were shaped to a significant degree by online rumors of financial
entanglements with another actor, as well as other online criticisms of her as a
divorced single mother.53) Cyber Libel is considered a widespread problem in
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47) See Sang-hun Choe, An Anger in Korea over More Than Beef, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/world/asia/12seoul.html.
48) See Choe, supra note 46.
49) See Cho, supra note 1.
50) See Michael Fitzpatrick, South Korean government looks to rein in the Net, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
5, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/05/business/worldbusiness/05iht-
sknet.html.
51) Id.
52) Jean H. Lee, S. Korean actress found dead in apparent suicide, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 2, 2008,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-10-02-3818550031_x.htm.
53) See, e.g., Sang-hun Choe, Web Rumors Tied to Korean Actress’s Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/world/asia/03actress.html?em; Jin-sil
Choi, Akpeuli Jukyeotda Dongryo · Netizen Kongbun [Negative replies kill Choi], SPORTSKHAN, Oct. 2,
2008, available at http://sports.khan.co.kr/news/sk_index.html?cat=view&art_id=
200810022225376&sec_id=562901 (Korean).
Korea,54) and those who consider themselves to be victims of defamation are
hardly confined to the ranks of celebrities. However, it is telling that the
expansion of the Real Name Verification System was expedited following the
suicide.55) The public will in favor of expanding the Real Name Verification
System was significantly influenced by the death of Ms. Choi.56)
IV. Comparison with Other Nations
1. Internet Censorship
Some degree of internet censorship occurs in about 25 of 41 countries
surveyed, including Korea,57) according to a recent study58) by the OpenNet
Initiative.59) Censorship is pervasive and government-orchestrated in
approximately a dozen countries with an authoritarian form of government,
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54) The Korean police reported 10,028 cases of online libel in 2007, a substantial increase
from the 3,667 cases reported in 2004. Sang-hun Choe, Korean Star’s Suicide Reignites Debate on
Web Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/13/
technology/internet/13suicide.html.
55) See Tee Jong Lee, Seoul Rushes Internet Bill, THE STRAITS TIMES, Oct. 13, 2008, available at
http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Asia/Story/STIStory_289173.html; Kim,
supra note 35. Officially, the expansion of the Real Name Verification System was achieved by a
new Presidential Decree, but the amount of political and social pressure for the issuance of the
decree following the death of Ms. Choi was substantial.
56) Examples of editorials and other news outlets arguing in favor of the expanded law in
light of Ms. Choi’s death are numerous. See, e.g., A Law for Choi Jin-sil, JOONGANG DAILY, Oct. 4,
2008, available at http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2895644; Kim, supra note
35 (stating that Agora, a popular Korean discussion site, was “overflowing with articles
supporting the expansion of real-name use on the Internet”). 
57) See OpenNet Initiative: South Korea, supra note 4.
58) Survey of Government Internet Filtering Practices Indicates Increasing Internet
Censorship, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/newsroom/first_global_filtering_survey_released
(last updated Mar. 10, 2008).
59) The OpenNet Initiative is a partnership amongst four non-profit educational organiza-
tions, the University of Toronto Citizen Lab, the Harvard University Berkman Center for
Internet & Society, the University of Cambridge Advanced Network Research Group, and the
Oxford University Oxford Internet Institute. The OpenNet Initiative tests and analyzes internet
censorship and surveillance worldwide. See About ONI, http://opennet.net/about-oni (last
visited Nov. 13, 2009). 
including China,60) Saudi Arabia,61) North Korea,62) and Myanmar,63) which
have internet regulation regimes far more restrictive than those in other
nations.64) Korean censorship is considerably less comprehensive and is
principally based on the National Security Act [Gukgaboanbeop],65) which
criminalizes anti-state activities and generally targets pro-North Korean
sympathizers.66) In 2004, the Ministry of Information and Communication
used the National Security Law as authority while instructing internet service
providers (“ISPs”) to block access to 31 internet sites it judged to be purveying
pro-North Korean propaganda,67) a measure that blocked access to several
thousand unrelated websites in the process.68)
While the legal basis and actual instances of internet censorship are more
targeted and limited in Korea than in certain other nations, Korea’s censorship
exceeds that of other democratic nations for which data on the subject is
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60) See OpenNet Initiative: China, http://opennet.net/research/profiles/china (June 15,
2009).
61) See OpenNet Initiative: Saudi Arabia, http://opennet.net/research/profiles/saudi-
arabia (Aug. 6, 2009).
62) See OpenNet Initiative: North Korea, http://opennet.net/research/profiles/north-
korea (May 10, 2007).
63) See OpenNet Initiative: Burma, http://opennet.net/research/profiles/burma (May 10,
2007).
64) The non-governmental organization Reporters without Borders, which advocates for
freedom of the press worldwide, identifies the following countries as applying a particularly
active censorship regime: Burma, China, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. See Reporters without Borders, Internet
Enemies, Mar. 12, 2009, available at http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/Internet_enemies_2009_2_-
3.pdf. See also OpenNet Initiative, http://opennet.net.
65) GUKGABOANBEOP [NATIONAL SECURITY ACT], Act No. 5454, Dec. 13, 1997.
66) The NATIONAL SECURITY ACT has been the subject of legal challenges in the past; in 2004,
the Supreme Court of Korea upheld convictions under article 7, which criminalizes the act of
publicly praising and supporting North Korea, as a constitutionally permissible restriction on
speech. 209 PANRYEGONGBO 1476 (2002Do539) (Supreme Court, July 22, 2004). See also A nation-
splitting law, KOREA HERALD, Sept. 8, 2004, available at http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/
article.asp?parentid=14429; South Korea’s National Security Law, ECONOMIST, Nov. 4, 2004.
67) OpenNet Initiative: Bulletin 009, available at http://opennet.net/bulletins/009/ (last
updated Jan. 31, 2005). 
68) According to OpenNet testing as of January 31, 2005, 3,167 additional websites
unrelated to North Korea were also blocked because they were hosted on the same servers as
the 31 blocked sites. Id. See also Seung Hun Lee, Block on North Korean Web Site Foils Net Users,
OHMYNEWS, Nov. 17, 2004, available at http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.
asp?menu=c10400&no=197117&rel_no=1.
available. The freedom of the press advocacy organization Reporters without
Borders identifies Korea and Australia as nations with concerning
government positions on censorship.69) In the case of Australia, however, the
source of concern is a proposed law that would introduce nationwide
censorship, rather than a presently implemented censorship regime.70) Of
nations studied by the OpenNet Initiative, the only democracy besides Korea
to engage in some form of internet censorship is India.71)
2. Real Name Verification
The Real Name Verification System is a step in the direction of limiting
free speech that goes beyond the policies of other democratic nations and is
made potentially more powerful by Korea’s existing internet censorship laws
and policies. Amongst democratic nations, even those (like Israel72) and
Ukraine73)) that one might expect, as a matter of conjecture, to introduce
internet censorship to protect national security and other vital national
concerns do not censor or take steps to systematically identify internet users. 
Comparison with China warrants specific consideration because China is
the only nation besides Korea to have internet name verification.74) China’s
system is not mandatory for any particular group of internet portals. A
program for the city of Hangzhou75) to require real name verification has
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69) See Reporters without Borders, supra note 64.
70) Id.
71) See OpenNet Initiative: India, http://opennet.net/research/profiles/india (May 9,
2007). India’s censorship focuses on national security-related sites, and has been applied
inconsistently and sporadically.
72) See OpenNet Initiative: Israel, http://opennet.net/research/profiles/israel (Aug. 6,
2009). I make particular note of Israel because of its persistent internal and external conflicts and
violence relating to matters of national security.
73) See OpenNet Initiative: Ukraine, http://opennet.net/research/profiles/ukraine (May 9,
2007). I make note of Ukraine because some recent elections have involved potential vote fraud,
and destabilizing events in its political sphere include the apparent near-lethal poisoning of its
president, Viktor Yushchenko.
74) Hua and Liang, supra note 30; David Bandurski, Xinhua: Hangzhou’s “real-name Web
registration system” is “on the shelf,” CHINA MEDIA PROJECT, May 20, 2009, available at http://cmp.
hku.hk/2009/05/20/1632/. 
75) Hangzhou includes eight administrative regions and has a population of approximately
6.43 million people. See Hangzhou China: Administrative Districts and Population, http://www.
officially been put into effect as of May 1, 2009, though progress in its technical
implementation is not clear.76) China’s approach has involved agreements
with major internet portals in which the portals individually implement real
name verification.77) However, China has imposed a mandatory real name
verification system for certain portals used by university students, a decision
evidently targeting political speech.78) It is not clear what sort of pressure the
Chinese government may have applied in securing ISP compliance with the
real name verification program.79) However, it is clear that, at the present time,
China does not have a nationwide mechanism for collecting and maintaining
information on the identities of internet users and contributors, as does Korea.
It should be noted that the presence of a name verification system does not
mean that the two countries will utilize identity information in the same way
or restrict the same kinds of online activities. However, in terms of the
verification system itself, Korea’s current model is more comprehensive than
the Chinese system.   
V. Initial Results and Controversies
1. Deterrence of Cyber Libel
Initial research has shown that in the first two years of Korea’s experience
with the Real Name Verification System, defamatory comments have not
become notably less common. A study examined comments and replies on a
popular internet portal’s bulletin boards and found that the number of total
comments decreased after the introduction of the Real Name Verification
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hangzhou.gov.cn/main/zpd/English/statistic/abriefsurvey/briefsurvey/T197434.shtml (last
visited Nov. 13, 2009).
76) Hua and Liang, supra note 30; Bandurski, supra note 74.
77) See Self-discipline for China blog providers, CCTV.COM, Aug. 22, 2007, available at http://
www.cctv.com/program/bizchina/20070822/105950.shtml; Anita Chang, China: Bloggers should
use real names, USA TODAY, Aug. 22, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/
topstories/2007-08-22-1543352646_x.htm.
78) Philip Pan, Chinese Crack Down On Student Web Sites, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2005, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A61334-2005Mar23.
79) One might wonder whether Chinese ISPs that are requested to implement name
verification of users are able, as a practical matter, to decline to do so. See Chang, supra note 77.
System, but the number of defamatory comments did not decrease.80) A more
general survey of online user behaviors has found that, contrary to common
assumption, the rate at which netizen behavior deviates from a particular
social norm is not impacted by anonymity.81)
A Korea Communications Commission study82) of the first phase of real-
name verification (for web portals with 300,000 or more users per day) found
that there was a decrease in the rate of malign internet posts83) from 15.8% to
13.9%.84) This is not necessarily inconsistent with other research, which
showed a small decrease in defamatory replies.85) However, the decline is
hardly precipitous. As a best-case evaluation of the Real Name Verification
System’s effectiveness, this study indicates that the System has produced little
improved protection of private reputation.86)
2. Google
Google owns the popular international site YouTube, which permits
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80) Woo et al., supra note 11, at 20-21. This study found that the number of defamatory
replies to comments did decrease, along with the number of replies in general, and this
reduction appeared to be the result of a change in replying patterns based on the level of use of
the commenter. In general, the issue explaining rates of Cyber Libel on the bulletin boards was
one of user behavior, not systematically reduced or otherwise affected by the Real Name
Verification System. 
81) Yong-suk Hwang, supra note 14, at 108.
82) This study evaluated the rate of malign reply; sought to gauge the “chilling effect” of the
law, or the degree, if any, to which it discouraged use of the internet; and also attempted to
measure the “balloon effect,” or the degree, if any, to which the law caused netizens to switch
from using large internet portals subject to the Real Name Verification System to smaller ones
not subject to the requirement. Bangsongtongsinwiwonhoe [Korea Communications Commis-
sion], Jaehanjeok boninhwakinjae hyogwabunseokeul wihan josa bogoseo [Analysis of the Effect of Limited
Real Name Verification], Oct. 2007, at 1-2 (Korean). The study asserted that the number of internet
posts and the popularity of large internet portals demonstrated a lack of chilling effect or
balloon effect. Id. at 18-20.
83) The term used to describe these messages in the study is “Akseongdaetgeul,” which I
describe in English as “malign.” The study defines the term to include libel, sexual harassment,
invasion of privacy, and contempt. Id. at 9.
84) Id.
85) See Woo et al., supra note 11, at 20-21.
86) Thorough studies of the expanded Real Name Verification System are not yet available,
so it is not yet possible to account for any effect brought about by inclusion of additional
internet portals.
registered users87) to upload videos that can then be streamed by anyone who
accesses the website. Registered users can also post comments about a
particular video, which are displayed below the video box on the computer
screen. Google objected to the Real Name Verification System as
compromising the anonymity and therefore the freedoms of its users.88)
Google interpreted the law to only apply to the Korean version of the
YouTube site, and so Google deactivated all uploads and commenting by
individuals whose country preference is set to “Korea” in order to avoid a
legal obligation to participate in the Real Name Verification System. However,
the youtube.com site links to a page89) that provides simple instructions for
changing the country preference to another country besides Korea,90) at which
point the user is free to upload and comment without verifying her real
name.91)
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87) While registering, users are asked to provide certain personal information, but the only
piece of information that is verified is that they have access to the email address that is
provided.
88) Google has a generally protective privacy policy, but its policy states that it will share
information when “[w]e have a good faith belief that access, use, preservation or disclosure of
such information is reasonably necessary to (a) satisfy any applicable law, regulation, legal
process or enforceable governmental request.” Google Privacy Center: Privacy Policy, http://
www.google.com/privacypolicy.html (last updated Oct. 19, 2009).
89) YouTube Korea Blog, http://youtubekrblog.blogspot.com/2009/04/blog-post_08.html
(last updated Apr. 8, 2009).
90) The ease by which Koreans can dodge the Real Name Verification System requirements
illustrates one of the problems with this law: given Korea’s unique approach to this problem,
there is not, and likely will not be in the foreseeable future, a harmonized international
approach that can aid in enforcement by effectively “closing the loophole” of Korean users
selecting a different jurisdiction’s legal standards for Google or other ISPs to effectively apply. 
91) Translation from Stephen Shankland, YouTube Korea squelches uploads, comments, CNET
NEWS, Apr. 13, 2009, available at http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10218419-93.html:
We have a bias in favor of people’s right to free expression in everything we do. We are
driven by a belief that more information generally means more choice, more freedom, and
ultimately more power for the individual. We believe that it is important for free expression that
people have the right to remain anonymous, if they choose. 
Because of Real Name Verification System in Korea, we have voluntarily disabled
comments and video uploads when using YouTube in Korea with the Korea country setting, so
you will not be required to verify your identity. 
You will still be able to enjoy watching and sharing videos on YouTube. You may still
upload videos and comments without proving your identity by choosing a non-Korean country
setting from the top of any YouTube page. 
3. Park (Minerva) Prosecution
Dae-sung Park was a widely read blogger on financial issues who posted
his writings under the internet alias “Minerva.”92) Mr. Park was arrested on
January 7, 200993) after he was accused of spreading online rumors asserting
that the Korean government compelled Korean banks not to buy U.S. dollars
in late 2008 in order to combat the falling value of the Korean currency, the
won, against the U.S. dollar.94) The prosecution alleged that this assertion was
false and that Mr. Park spread the rumor with the intent to damage public
interest, in violation of the Electronic Communication Fundamental Law
[Jeonki tongsin kibonbeop].95) He was acquitted by the Seoul Central District
Court on April 20, 2009.96) Judge Young-hyun Yoo stated that “when con-
sidering all the circumstances, it is hard to conclude that Park was aware that
the information was misleading when he wrote the postings” and also did not
conclude that Park intended to damage public interest.97)
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We understand that this may affect your experience on YouTube. Thank you in advance for
your understanding. We hope that you continue to enjoy and participate in the YouTube
community.
92) Minerva is the goddess of wisdom in Roman mythology (known in Greek mythology as
Athena).
93) See Christian Oliver, Financial Blogger Arrested in South Korea, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2009,
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/092a99ca-ddab-11dd-87dc-000077b07658.html?nclick_
check=1; see also Jane Han, Foreigners Puzzled over Park’s Arrest, KOREA TIMES, Jan. 11, 2009,
available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2009/01/123_37648.html.
94) See Ju-min Park and John M. Glionna, Case of Internet Economic Pundit Minerva Roils
South Korea, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/16/
world/fg-korea-minerva16.
95) JEONKI KONGSIN KIBONBEOP [ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION FUNDAMENTAL ACT], Act No.
9780, art. 47(1) states:
A person spreading a false rumor maliciously intending to damage the public interest by
using an electronic machine can be sentenced to imprisonment for under five years or given a
fine of under 50,000,000 won.   
96) S. Korean Court Finds “Minerva” Not Guilty, KOREA TIMES, Apr. 20, 2009, available at
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/04/113_43467.html. 
97) Id.; see also Sang-hun Choe, Economic Blogger Who Angered Seoul is Acquitted, N. Y. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/21/business/global/21blogger.
html.
VI. Critical Analysis of the Real Name Verification System
1. Effectiveness
Empirical evidence indicates that rates of Cyber Libel have not been
significantly reduced by the introduction of the System.98) Further, the Real
Name Verification System is easily circumvented by premeditating defamers
and will thus fail to prevent the most dangerous and blameworthy defamatory
statements, those that are actually false and made with an intent to defame the
subject.99) Google’s response to the law as it applies to YouTube, complete
with posting a link to a web page with simple instructions for the law’s cir-
cumvention posted in Korean,100) demonstrates one means by which internet
contributors can effectively avoid the requirement. Migration to the use of
Google products, not just for posting online videos but also for blogging101)
and other methods of creating online content, has become an increasingly
popular method for individuals in Korea to remain anonymous.102) Given the
means available to a party who intends to defame another online, including
the use of someone else’s identification number,103) it seems that the Real
Name Verification System is particularly unlikely to prevent the most
premeditated and egregious acts of defamation.104)
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98) See supra Section V. 1., “Deterrence of Cyber Libel.”
99) Under Korean law, defamation does not require a showing that the allegedly
defamatory statement is false or that the accused had intent to defame, but these two factors
trigger heightened potential punishments. See CRIMINAL CODE, art. 309; INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK ACT, art. 70. See also supra Section II, “Relevant Defamation Law.” 
100) See YouTube Korea Blog, supra note 89.
101) Google provides its “Blogger” service (www.blogger.com) to Korean users. So far, it
has not qualified for the Real Name Verification System due to the number of daily users, but
the site could be the source of future conflict with the Korean government if its popularity
continues to grow.
102) See Tong-hyun Kim, Google Avoids Regulations, Korean Portals Not so Lucky, KOREA TIMES,
Apr. 27, 2009, available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/tech/tech_view.asp?
newsIdx=43939&categoryCode=129.
103) A google.com search conducted by the Korean Information Security Agency produced
well over a hundred thousand usable Korean ID numbers that could be obtained for free online.
Google Exposing Thousands of Korean ID Numbers, CHOSUNILBO, Sept. 22, 2008, available at
http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200809/200809220010.html.
How could the Korean government boost the effectiveness of the law?
One option might be to further strengthen the law, such as by increasing
penalties. However, to target those who can currently evade identification, the
only options for truly preventing the posting of defamatory statements might
be to require heavily trafficked sites to not permit any postings or
commentary at all, or to sharply confine user contributions and assign
heightened ISP liability for postings and contributions that are permitted.105)
Regardless of whether this would be constitutional in Korea, such legal
modifications seem too draconian and likely to chill internet freedoms to be
seriously considered.
The government might also consider a change in the law or the enforcement
of the law to elicit a more cooperative stance by Google and to deter other
major ISPs who would permit Korean users to effectively select another
jurisdiction’s laws when utilizing a service.106) This measure could force the
issue that Google has sought to avoid: a choice between on the one hand,
complying with the letter (and spirit) of the law and compromising a stated
objective of promoting “privacy” for internet users,107) or on the other hand,
more fully limiting Korean access to the site, thereby reducing the reach and
market share of internet properties while preserving user anonymity.
However, the Korean government first faces the awkward and difficult choice
of either accepting Google’s current position or initiating an open conflict with
the company.
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104) Provocative research already exists suggesting that instances of Cyber Libel have not
been curbed by the introduction of the Real Name Verification System. See Woo et al., supra note
11, at 20-21.
105) Scholars have called into question whether current legal requirements for Korean ISPs
may already be too onerous. See Kwon, supra note 23, at 131-134.
106) Many available internet portals do not have a legal presence in Korea and could
operate outside of Korea’s Real Name Verification System with no obligation or legal
consequence for doing so. The greatest impact of the law may ultimately be to cause individuals
to switch to non-Korean portals that might be less likely to be frequently viewed by a large
Korean audience. In that case, compelling removal of the offending content would be made
more difficult or even impossible. In the process, Korea could make itself a less attractive
jurisdiction for major ISPs to maintain an employment-generating, tax-paying physical
presence.
107) See Google Privacy Center, supra note 88.
2. Interference with Free Expression and Privacy
Free expression is critical to a politically free society, and free expression
on the internet is particularly critical to Korean democratic culture. As
Professor Youngjoon Kwon states, “Online democracy [in Korea] has reached
its pinnacle, due mainly to two factors: a remarkably high broadband
penetration rate and a great number of electronic bulletin boards.”108) To this I
would add a more abstract consideration, the youth and vigor of Korea’s less-
than-20-year-old democracy, which has largely taken shape in the internet
age.
In the case of Korea, the same generations of individuals who utilize the
internet as part of everyday life witnessed and participated in the birth of the
present Korean democracy.109) The potential of cyberspace to facilitate many
forms of democratic activity, together with the fact that these activities have
taken place online for about as long as civilian democracy has existed in
Korea, establish a meaningful social link between internet freedom and
democracy. 
Cyberspace has already facilitated South Korean democratic participation,
as illustrated by the crucial role of online political activism in the election of
former President Moo-hyun Roh. Mr. Roh ran against the favored Grand
National Party candidate Hoi-chang Lee in the 2002 election with a political
strategy that made extensive use of online campaigning and used e-mail and
text messages to communicate with supporters. One online point of coalescence
for Roh supporters was the popular online news site OhmyNews.110) On the
day of the elections, Roh supporters furiously blogged and encouraged others
to vote.111) Roh narrowly won the presidency.112) Online political activities
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108) Kwon, supra note 23, at 122.
109) The transition from authoritarian government to democracy was at least partially
driven by mostly peaceful protests in Korea.
110) Woo-Young Chang, Online Civic Participation, and Political Empowerment: Online Media
and Public Opinion Formation in Korea, 27 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y, 925, 931 (2005).
111) Id. 
112) See Sang Yin Lee, Rohmoohyun 16dae daetongryung dangseon [Roh Moo Hyun elected as the
16th president], CHOSUNILBO, Dec. 19, 2002, available at http://news.chosun.com/svc/content_
view/content_view.html?contid=2002121970408 (Korean).
intersected with traditional political organization and arguably helped to
determine a critical election outcome and created new roles for citizen
participation in politics.113)
In light of the social value of free expression, the concept of “privacy” in
the online space becomes more complicated. Proponents of the Real Name
Verification System correctly assert that individuals have an interest in the
protection of their private “personal rights,” such as reputation and freedom
from libel.114) However, individuals also have an interest in privacy in a
different sense, that is, in maintaining an anonymous profile online for the
purposes of utilizing legitimate expressive and associative opportunities while
being insulated from the possibility of stigma or suppression.115) While some
have questioned the value of anonymous expression,116) examples of the value
of anonymity include the sharing of sensitive information regarding personal
health issues, matters of personal and sexual identity,117) and politically
controversial topics.118) The Constitution explicitly protects the reputation of
Korean individuals,119) but reputation should be understood to include
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113) See Ihlwan Moon, Have Computers, Will Fight for Reform, BUS. WK., Feb. 16, 2004, available
at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_07/b3870077.htm. 
114) See Wan Choung, Cyberpokryeokui Pihaesiltaewa Daeeungbangan [A Legal Study of Cyber
Violence], 13 PIHAEJAHAKYEONGU [KOREAN J. OF VICTIMOLOGY] 329, 347-48 (2005). Professor Choung
describes “in-gyeok kwon,” translated here as “personal rights,” as requiring the protection
provided by such policies as the Real Name Verification System.
115) As Justice Hugo Black insightfully wrote in Talley v. California, a case in which the U.S.
Supreme Court invalidated a Los Angeles city ordinance illegalizing handbills unless they were
printed with the names and addresses of their authors, “Persecuted groups and sects from time
to time throughout history have been able to criticize the oppressive practices and laws either
anonymously or not at all… It is plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the
most constructive purposes.” Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1960).
116) This debate also rages in American society. See, e.g., Randy Cohen, Is It O.K. to Blog
About This Woman Anonymously?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2009, available at http://ethicist.
blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/24/is-it-ok-to-blog-about-this-woman-anonymously/?emc=eta1.
117) See Woo and Lee, supra note 16, at 28-29 (citing David J. Phillips, Negotiating the Digital
Closet: Online Pseudonyms and the Politics of Sexual Identity, 5 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 406 (2002)).
118) Although this discussion principally focuses on opportunities for overtly political
expression online, the concept of “democratic culture” that is embodied and advanced by online
expression can be much more inclusive, including topics from all facets of popular culture.
According to Professor Jack Balkin, “Freedom of speech means giving everyone … the chance to
use technology to participate in their culture, to interact, to create, to build … whether it be
[about] politics, public issues, or popular culture.” Balkin, supra note 2, at 45.
119) See CONSTITUTION OF KOREA, art. 21(4).
personal control over reputation, and integral to that control is power over the
public identity that the individual creates for herself.
Initial Korean government analysis suggested that the Real Name
Verification System had not had a “chilling effect” on Korean expression
through the internet due to a consistent or increasing number of posts after the
System was introduced.120) However, this fact alone does not establish a lack
of chilling effect, as the introduction of Real Name Verification may have
slowed the rate of increase in posting that may have otherwise occurred.
Furthermore, statistics alone cannot reveal the kind of expression that is made
(or not made) through the internet, and it is possible that speech on particularly
sensitive but socially important subjects has been reduced.
At best, the Real Name Verification System invites misapplication.
Heightened online restrictions and punishments have been defended as a way
to prevent or at least more swiftly punish “a second and third ‘Minerva’
situation,”121) but Mr. Park was not guilty of a crime. The prevention of the
second and third Minervas, then, would not appear to be an act of crime
prevention, but rather a restriction of the free exchange of information and
ideas regarding topics of the utmost social importance.
3. A Proposal for Mitigating Individual Freedom Concerns
Since the most troubling (and internationally distinctive) aspect of the Real
Name Verification System is that it is mandatory, it may be effective to convert
the System to a voluntary program where ISPs may “opt-in.” This would
permit posters to seek the System’s protections while also respecting others’
preferences for privacy and open expression. Assuming that some major ISPs
would opt into the Real Name Verification System while others would not,
bloggers and other authors could choose between preserving their own
anonymity and accepting that commenters would also be anonymous, or
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120) Korea Communications Commission, supra note 82, at 18.
121) At Assembly hearings in January 2009, See-joong Choi, chairman of the Korea
Communications Commission, said, “If there were a cyber defamation law, we would be able to
avoid a second and third ‘Minerva’ situation.” Tong-hyung Kim, Cyber Defamation Law May Be
Softened, KOREA TIMES, Apr. 21, 2009, available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/
biz/2009/04/123_43565.html.
registering for the Real Name Verification System, foregoing full anonymity
for the comfort that those posting responses would also have completed the
registration process. While this proposal does not solve the problem of
original defamatory posts (as such posters would be likely to avoid portals
opting into the System), it would preserve a major purported benefit of the
Real Name Verification System while providing channels for fully free
expression.
VII. Conclusion
Korea, as a society, sets a relatively restrictive set of parameters for free
speech in an attempt to balance this liberty with reputational protection. A
critical assessment of the Real Name Verification System reveals that the
measure has thus far been of little help in combating Cyber Libel, while its
consequences for freedom of expression cannot be dismissed. It may be most
propitious to seek an alternative legal approach to address Cyber Libel
without interfering to such a degree with freedom of expression and personal
privacy. As the Constitutional Court has counseled, “[T]he regulatory modes
for this ever changing sphere of communication [the internet] also should be
explored within the framework of the Constitution in a diverse and innovative
way.”122) Can we unbundle private defamation from valued personal
expression and political speech in a meaningful way to effectively isolate and
target Cyber Libel?
The threat of criminal prosecution deeply entangles the state with online
expression and may operate as a blunt instrument for the deterrence of truly
wrongful internet postings. To deter defamation without stifling internet
expression, civil remedies provide an efficient and minimally intrusive
means.123) Korean law already permits purported victims of Cyber Libel to
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122) Constitutional Court, supra note 14, at 632. 
123) As discussed supra Section II. 2., Korea provides for criminal punishment of
defamation. While prosecutors are generally obliged to investigate complaints they receive from
purported victims, the Seoul Prosecutor’s Office has, in the past, established certain policies and
parameters for the enforcement of particular laws. See, e.g., Ah-young Chung, Commercial Online
Music File Swappers Face Criminal Charges, KOREA TIMES, Jan. 16, 2006, available at http://www. 
object to offensive content, which is then removed by the ISP hosting the
content while it is reviewed.124) This measure provides a powerful initial
protection against the continued presence of the allegedly defamatory content
after it has been discovered by the victim. To address compensation for
potential damages, and to provide a legal channel for alleged victims to
pursue public justice, should they so desire, the Korean Civil Code125)
provides for remedies for defamation.126)
No doubt an objection to such a reliance on civil law would be that civil
remedies are often costly for an alleged victim to pursue. However, the
infrastructure and delegated resources for removing Cyber Libel are already
in place, so the matter of preventing future harm to the victim is addressed,
while only the matter of compensation and other restorative measures127)
assessed against the poster personally is left to a civil dispute amongst the
parties.128) Furthermore, resource barriers to seeking justice through the
Korean civil court may not be particularly great, given the ability of Korean
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asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=37126 (describing a Seoul Prosecutor’s Office policy
that only those who infringe copyrights through online file-sharing for commercial gain would
be criminally prosecuted, while non-commercial file-sharers would not be). Complaints of at
least certain kinds of Cyber Libel may be best directed away from criminal prosecution and
towards a civil court remedy. 
124) INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK ACT, art. 44-2(4).
125) This arrangement better aligns the legal intervention against most cases of potential
defamation with the purposes of the Korean codes. Commentary has distinguished the Criminal
Code defamation provisions, intended to be used for maintaining “public peace and order,”
with the Civil Code defamation provisions, intended for “safeguarding … reputations.” Youm,
supra note 14, at 144.
126) CIVIL CODE, art. 751, monetary compensation may be awarded for damages as follows:
1) A person who had injured another person, his liberty or reputation … shall make
compensation for any other damage arising therefrom as well as damage in the
property;
2) The court may order the compensation under the preceding paragraph paid by
periodical payments and may order a reasonable security furnished in order to ensure
the performance of such obligation.
127) CIVIL CODE, article 764 permits the court, pursuant to the request of the injured party,
“to take suitable measures to restore the injured party’s reputation, either in lieu of or together
with compensation for damages.”
128) For a discussion of civil remedies related to the invasion of private data, see Sang Jo
Jong and Youngjoon Kwon, Kaein Jungboui Bohowa Minsajeok Kujaesudan [Protection of Personal
Data and its Civil Remedy], 630 BEOPJO [KOREA LAWYERS ASSOCIATION JOURNAL] 5 (2009) (Korean).
litigants to represent themselves and preserve a reasonable opportunity for a
favorable outcome. In this way, a victim who believes that the wrong against
them was not satisfactorily ameliorated by the removal of a particular
message or post could capably seek relief in civil court.129)
The uniquely transformative power of the internet is a linchpin on both
sides of the Real Name Verification System debate, as both the effects of
defamation and misinformation on one hand, and the value of free expression
on the other, are enhanced by an unregulated and widely accessed internet. In
Korea in particular, the damage of Cyber Libel to reputation has the potential
to be great, but the positive effects of a broad body of shared online political
and social information and opinions are also much magnified. The legal
system should work to protect victims of Cyber Libel, but the Real Name
Verification System is, on balance, not an effective instrument for mitigating
Cyber Libel while preserving social freedoms.
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129) Under Korean law, there is not a mechanism by which a poster of content who believes
her content was wrongly removed from the internet can seek to have the content restored.
Introducing such a cause of action may provide a more balanced means by which civil
proceedings can resolve lingering grievances of both parties in cases of purported Cyber Libel.
